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THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS: ARE
CAMARA AND SEE STILL ALIVE AND WELL?
INTRODUCTION
The law of administrative inspections has undergone a significant
transition in the last five years, as a consequence of the Supreme Court's
redefinition of the scope of the fourth amendment. Although this note
will explore the historical underpinnings of this shift in interpretation,
it focuses primarily on developments since the Court's landmark deci-
sions in Camara and See. The continued validity of those rulings will
be examined by surveying the relevant case law as well as the response
of the states to the problems created by the Court.
HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Conflicting interpretations of the fourth amendment have survived
to the present day. One view proceeds on the theory of the interrela-
tionship of the fourth' and fifth 2 amendments, resulting in a limitation
of the constitutional protections to searches for criminal evidence.3 The
1. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. (Emphasis added).
3. In the early colonial years people were harassed by searches and seizures
made pursuant to writs of assistance and general warrants. But since these general
warrants were used to authorize, on mere suspicion, a search for evidence of seditions,
libels, and seizures of all suspected papers, they were declared illegal and void in the
famous English case of Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials, col. 1029 (Ct.
C.P. 1765).
Under this view, the historical setting of the fourth amendment is limited to a
reading of criminal cases such as Entick, which is considered the predecessor to the
fourth amendment. By so doing, it becomes apparent that "civil" searches were in-
tended to be outside fourth amendment protection. This approach to fourth amendment
history was adopted by the Supreme Court in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,
363-65 (1959). The Frank Court reinforced this view by looking to Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which it considered to be an application of the rationale
in Entick. In Boyd, the Court held that where certain severe penalties imposed by
customs laws "in substance" converted a civil proceeding into a criminal case, a
court order compelling production of a document violated the fourth and fifth amend-
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other adopts the approach that the fourth amendment was intended to
protect the privacy of the home-whether "civil" or "criminal" evi-
dence be the object of the search.4 In addition to this civil-criminal
dichotomy in fourth amendment interpretation, two theories have
evolved concerning the relationship of the fourth amendment's two
basic clauses. 5 The first approach, which was followed by the Su-
preme Court for more than 150 years, views the reasonableness and
warrant clauses as complements, so that a warrant is considered to be
ments. Proceeding on a theory of the interrelationship between the two amendments,
the Boyd Court held that the fourth amendment was violated because the production
order was the "equivalent" of an unreasonable search, since it required the accused to
give evidence against himself in a criminal case. For a suggestion that the Frank
Court misread Entick and Boyd in light of the entire fourth amendment history see
44 MINN. L. Rav. 513 (1960); 28 U. CIN. L. Rav. 478 (1959).
4. The colonial history of abuses has a broader scope than searches and seizures
in connection with criminal libel proceedings. The colonists wanted security against
intrusion into personal privacy as an ultimate value on its own. 28 U. CIN. L. Rnv.
478, 483 (1959). The colonists were also outraged at the unrestricted use of civil
writs and warrants to enforce customs laws. 44 Mui. L. Rnv. 513, 521-22 (1960).
In this regard particular attention should be given to James Otis' argument against the
writs of assistance in Paxton's Case, Quincy's Massachusetts Reports 1761-1772,
51,471 (1761), wherein he states: "this writ is against the fundamental principles
of Law-The Privilege of House. A man, who is quiet, is as secure in his house, as a
Prince in his castle." From this it is argued that the framers of the fourth amendment
did not intend to distinguish between civil and criminal searches. This view is sup-
ported by the words of the fourth amendment itself, which suggest no limitation to
criminal searches. In addition to the foregoing, this theory views "both Boyd and
Entick as tend[ing] . . . to support the view that the fourth amendment requires a
warrant for both criminal and civil searches. Both cases suggest that even where the
state has a strong interest in utilizing a power of search, and where search is con-
ducted pursuant to a judicially issued warrant, the reasonableness of that search will
nevertheless be subjected to close constitutional scrutiny." 44 MINN. L. REv. 513, 526
(1960). [Emphasis in original].
Additional support for the right of privacy conception of the fourth amendment can
be found in the Supreme Court's decisions relating to the scope of administrative sub-
poenas. The Court has established certain requirements that must be met in issuing
subpoenas, in part to protect the privacy of the person being investigated. E.g.,
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
See Note, Administrative Inspection Procedures Under the Fourth Anendment-Ad-
ministrative Probable Cause, 32 ALB. L. RFv. 155, 164 (1967).
5. The first clause is a recognition of a right of privacy. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The sec-
ond clause "provides the basic procedural test for determining the reasonableness of a
search." Note, The Right of the People to be Secure: The Developing Role of the
Search Warrant, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1119 (1967). See United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
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a prerequisite to a reasonable search." In 1950 the Supreme Court
adopted the second theory, which holds that the reasonableness of a
search can be determined independently of the warrant requirement. 7
Strains of these various theories and interpretations run throughout the
law of administrative search and seizure.
Administrative Inspections
Statutory provisions which authorize administrative inspection of
commercial structures, and of one's home, date to colonial times.8
Here the inspector, theoretically, is not interested in prosecuting a per-
son for building or sanitary code violations, but is only desirous of
securing an individual's compliance with the applicable code section.9
The courts which have addressed themselves to the problem of whe-
ther a warrant is required under such circumstances have reached con-
flicting results, leaving this area of the law unsettled. 10 Beginning in
1869, the lower federal courts consistently held that the fourth amend-
ment applied only to criminal investigations." The constitutionality
6. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42-43 (1966);
Note, The Right of the People to be Secure: The Developing Role of the Search War-
rant, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1119 (1967). E.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
456 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925). For administrative
search and seizure cases representing this view: Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); District of Columbia
v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
7. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), wherein the Court stated:
"The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search was reasonable." Id. at 66. For administrative search and seizure
cases representing this view: Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Frank v. Mary-
land, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
8. See Note, Administrative Inspection Procedures Under the Fourth Amendment
-Administrative Probable Cause, 32 ALB. L. REV. 115, 159 (1967). See also Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367-68 nn. 5 & 6 (1959).
9. See 65 COLUM. L. REv. 288, 294 (1965).
10. Compare Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir.
1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950) (requiring a search warrant absent
valid consent or emergency) with Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (decision
arguably authorizing a warrantless home visit by welfare caseworker); Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (authorizing warrantless health code inspection).
11. In re Meador, 16 F. Cas. 1294, 1299 (No. 9375) (N.D. Ga. 1869): "rThis is
a civil proceeding and in no way does it partake of the character of a criminal prose-
cution . . . therefore, in this proceeding the fourth amendment is not violated." In re
Strouse, 23 F. Cas. 261, 262 (No. 13,548) (D. Nev. 1871): "[T]he fourth amendment
.. is applicable in criminal cases only." Cf. United States v. Three Tons of
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of warrantless administrative inspections was seldom challenged 12 until
the 1949 decision of District of Columbia v. Little.'3 Mrs. Little re-
fused to allow a health inspector to enter without a warrant and was
convicted of having "hindered, obstructed, and interfered" with an in-
spector of the Health Department in the performance of his duty. 14
On appeal the government argued that a warrant is not required when
there is no search for evidence of a crime,'3 since the fourth amend-
ment is "premised upon and limited by the fifth amendment provisions
regarding self-incrimination.""' In affirming the reversal of the con-
viction, Judge Prettyman, for the court of appeals, rejected the govern-
ment's argument, stating:
The basic premise of the prohibition against searches was not protec-
tion against self-incrimination; it was the common law right of a man
to privacy in his home, a right which is one of the essentials of our
concept of civilization. . . . It was not related to crime or to suspicion
of crime. It belonged to all men, not merely criminals, real or sus-
pected . . . To say that a man suspected of crime has a right to pro-
tection against search of his home without a warrant, but that a man
not suspected of crime has no such protection, is a fantastic absurdity."'
The United States Supreme Court avoided the constitutional issue and
affirmed18 on the ground that defendant's refusal to unlock her door
was not "interference" within the meaning of the district statute.'
Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149 (No. 16,515) (E.D. Wis. 1875); United States v. Distillery No.
Twenty Eight, 25 F. Cas. 868 (No. 14,966) (D. Ind. 1875); Stockwell v. United
States, 23 F. Cas. 116 (No. 13,466) (C.C.D. Me. 1870); In re Platt, 19 F. Cas. 815
(No. 11,212) (S.D.N.Y. 1874).
12. The constitutionality of such inspections of commercial premises had previously
been challenged on several occasions, but without success. See, e.g., Hubbell v. Hig-
gins, 148 Iowa 36, 126 N.W. 914 (1910); Dederick v. Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 184 A.
595 (1936).
13. 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
14. Id. at 14.
15. Id. at 16.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 16-17. "Distinction between 'inspection' and 'search' of a home has
no basis in semantics, in constitutional history, or in reason. Inspect means to look
at, search means to look for. To say that the people, in requiring adoption of the
Fourth Amendment, meant to restrict invasion of their homes if government officials
were looking for something, but not to restrict it if the officials were merely looking, is
to ascribe to the electorate of that day and to the several legislatures and the Congress a
degree of irrationality not otherwise observable in their dealings with tyranny." Id.
at 18.
18. 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
19. "This is . . . an appropriate case in which to apply our sound general policy
316 [Vol. 1972:313
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In Frank v. Maryland,20 the Supreme Court decided the question
left unanswered by its disposition of the Little case. An inspector of
the Baltimore City Health Department, acting under a provision of the
Baltimore Health Code authorizing warrantless inspections for cause, 2'
sought entry into a dwelling believed to be the source of rat infestation.
Frank refused to allow the inspector to enter and was arrested and
convicted for violating the code. A divided Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the code provision, and rejected appellant's claim of
protection, under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 2  After re-
viewing the historical background of the fourth amendment, 3 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, writing for four members of the court, rejected the
fundamental basis of the court of appeals' decision in Little, holding
instead that a warrant meeting the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment was needed only when the search or inspection was intended to
secure evidence of a crime. 24 The Court found the constitutional right
to privacy was not entitled to protection in this case since the intrusion
under a health code inspection was slight compared with that of a
criminal search. 3 The inspection touched "at most upon the per-
against deciding constitutional questions if the record permits final disposition of a
cause on non-constitutional grounds." Id. at 4.
20. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). The cases which arose between the Supreme Court
decisions in Little and Frank indicate the courts were not willing to follow the ap-
proach of the court of appeals in Little. See Perry v. City of Birmingham, 38 Ala.
App. 460, 88 So. 2d 577 (1956), where a state statute requiring officers to obtain a
warrant before searching for evidence of violation of liquor laws was held inapplica-
ble to the enforcement of municipal liquor ordinances; Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484,
124 A.2d 764 (1956) which arose under the same statute as was involved in Frank.
Here inspectors representing the Commissioner of Health, the Building's Inspection
Engineer and the Chief Engineer of the Fire Department, accompanied by an electrical
inspector and a uniformed policeman, visited the premises of appellant and asked per-
mission to enter to make an inspection of the premises under the Baltimore City Code.
The appellant refused the right of entry to the inspection team, and was subsequently
found guilty of violations relating to the buildings. Appellant attacked the conviction
upon the ground that these were unlawful searches. In affirming, the court of appeals
determined that the inspection was not unlawful and did not involve any violation of
the Maryland Constitution or the fourteenth amendment; Richards v. City of Columbia,
227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955) (The constitutionality of a municipal housing
ordinance, a provision of which authorized housing inspections without warrants, was
upheld by a divided court.).
21. 359 U.S. at 361.
22. Id. at 366.
23. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
24. 359 U.S. at 365-66.
25. Id. at 366.
317
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iphery of the important interests safeguarded by the fourteenth amend-
ment. "2' The court went on to explain:
But giving the fullest scope to this constitutional right to privacy, its
protection cannot here be invoked. The attempted inspection of ap-
pellant's home is merely to determine whether conditions exist which the
Baltimore Health Code proscribes. If they do appellant is notified to
remedy the infringing conditions. No evidence for criminal prosecution
is sought to be seized. Appellant is simply directed to do what he could
have been ordered to do without any inspection, and what he cannot
properly resist, namely, act in a manner consistent with the maintenance
of minimum community standards of health and well being, including
his own. Appellant's resistance can only be based, not on admissable
self-protection, but on a rarely voiced denial of any official justification
for seeking to enter his home. 27
Mr. Justice Whittaker concurred in the opinion of the court on the
basis that under the facts of this case he could not say that the con-
viction was premised on an unreasonable search.28  Mr. Justice Doug-
las, writing for the four dissenters, urged that both history and current
authority show that the fourth amendment protects the privacy and
dignity of the individual from invasion by "officious" government offi-
cers, without distinguishing between searches for "civil" or "criminal"
evidence.29
After the Frank decision, the homeowner, when confronted by an
inspector, was forced to make one of two choices. He could either
refuse entry, thereby subjecting himself to criminal penalties, or permit
26. Id. at 367.
27. Id. at 366. The Court in Frank also considered the problem of whether a
warrant could legally be obtained if one were required. The Court feared either that
it could not be obtained because of the strict constitutional requirements of probable
cause regulating their issuance, or that these requirements would thereby be lowered.
Both alternatives were unsatisfactory to the Court-the first because it would greatly
impair the efficiency of the inspection program, and the second because it would be
constitutionally unacceptable. Id. at 373.
28. 359 U.S. at 373-74.
29. Id. at 374-82. The dissent particularly objected to the fact there were adequate
grounds and opportunity for the inspector to obtain a warrant if he had chosen to do
so; and pointed out that the need for a power of entry for health inspectors is question-
able, since they are seldom denied entry. Id. at 381-83. Finally, the dissenters
adopted the court's argument in District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir.
1949): '"To say that a man suspected of a crime has a right to protection against
search of his home without warrant, but that a man not suspected of crime has no
such protection, is a fantastic absurdity." 359 U.S. at 378.
(Vol. 1972:313
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entry, and thus subject himself to possible priminal prosecution, if the
official discovered evidence of criminal activity during the inspection.30
Camara AND See
Although Frank was followed by the courts in the years after its
decision,3 the sharp split among the members of the Court as to the
30. For a commentary taking critical view of the Frank decision see 44 MINN. L.
REv. 513, 531-33 (1960).
31. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960): the Supreme Court
affirmed ex necessitate an Ohio Supreme Court decision, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d
523 (1958), in which a warrantless inspection was held to be constitutional. In
Price there was no showing of a belief on the part of the inspector, nor was one re-
quired, that a code violation did exist.
There are two noticeable differences between Frank v. Maryland and the Price
case: (1) there is only a twenty dollar fine under the Baltimore ordinance while under
the Dayton, Ohio ordinance a maximum fine of $200, thirty days in jail, or both may
be imposed and; (2) the Baltimore ordinance requires the officer to have cause to
suspect that a nuisance exists in the dwelling before he can enter without a warrant,
while the Dayton ordinance does not.
The dissent in Price argued that this decision went much further than the decision
in Frank in that here only a general demand for entry was made. As in Frank, the
dissent argued that when a homeowner refuses to consent to such an inspection a
warrant should be required before the inspector may proceed. In response to the
criticisms of such a requirement the dissent said:
It has been suggested that if the Fourth Amendments requirement of a search
warrant is acknowledged to be applicable here the result will be general
watering down of the standards for the issuance of search warrants. For it
is said that since it is agreed that a warrant for a health and safety inspec-
tion can be made on a showing quite different in kind from that which
would, for example, justify a search for narcotics, magistrates will become lax
generally in issuing warrants. The suggested preventative for this laxity is
a drastic one: dispense with warrants for these inspections. We cannot
believe that here it is necessary thus to burn down the house to roast the
pig. 364 U.S. 263, 273 (1960).
See also Parrish v. Civil Service Comm., 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr.
623 (1967) (holding unconstitutional pre-dawn searches without warrants to deter-
mine welfare eligibility where denial of admittance was basis for cutting off funds; the
court followed the Frank guidelines by stating that the evidence sought would have been
the basis for prosecution and there was no suspicion as to the eligibility of the occu-
pants of the homes searched); State v. Schaffel, 4 Conn. Cir. 234, 229 A.2d 552
(1966) (conviction affirmed, where there was specific complaint and probable cause
that there was a violation of the housing code); State v. Rees, 258 Iowa 813, 139
N.W.2d 406 (1966) (upholding, in arson case, use of evidence obtained without a
warrant by fire inspector investigating criminal cause of fire, when statute authorized
investigation); Commonwealth v. Hadley, 351 Mass. 439, 222 N.E.2d 681 (1966),
vacated, 388 U.S. 464 (1967) (upheld conviction for refusal to admit inspectors con-
ducting city program of code enforcement); City of St. Louis v. Evans, 337 S.W.2d 948
(Mo. 1960) (affirming conviction for refusing to admit building commissioner who was
"empowered at anytime between nine o'clock a.m. and six o'clock p.m., or at any time
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scope of the fourth amendment suggested the issue had not been finally
settled. Eight years later the issue of warrantless administrative
searches confronted the Court again in Camara v. Municipal Court3 2
and See v. City of Seattle.33 In Camara an inspector of the Divivision
of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public
Health, having been informed by appellant's landlord that the rear
portion of his leased premises was being used for residential purposes,
contrary to the building's occupancy permit, sought to inspect the
apartment on two occasions but was refused entry. On both occasions
appellant refused entry to the inspector because of his failure to pro-
duce a search warrant. Thereupon appellant was directed to appear
at the district attorney's office, but he failed to comply with the citation.
He again refused to allow the inspection even though the ordinance
authorizing such warrantless searches was read to him.14  He was then
arrested for failure to comply with the ordinance and was released on
bail.35
Appellant's demurrer to the criminal complaint was denied, where-
upon he filed a petition for a writ of prohibition alleging the ordinance
authorizing the warrantless search was unconstitutional under the
fourth and fourteenth amendments because it "authorizes municipal
officials to enter a private dwelling without a search warrant and
without probable cause to believe that a violation of the Housing Code
exists therein."3 6
The Court vacated the California court's denial of the writ, holding
that the fourth amendment bars prosecution of a person who has re-
fused to permit a warrantless code enforcement inspection of his pri-
it is necessary in his opinion to enter any structure); People v. Laveme, 14 N.Y.2d
304, 200 N.E.2d 441, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964) (conviction for violation of building
zoning ordinance authorizing inspector "to enter any building or premises at any rea-
sonable time" reversed, since evidence was for purpose of criminal prosecution and
there was no warrant); People v. Belcher, 49 Misc. 2d 631, 268 N.Y.S.2d 148
(Nassau County Ct. 1966) (permitting police to enter private property to investi-
gate potential hazard to public health when there was complaint); People v. Maddaus,
17 N.Y.2d 625, 216 N.E.2d 332, 269 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1966); State v. Johnson, 119
Ohio App. 477, 200 N.E.2d 711 (1962) (upholding conviction for refusing to permit
entry of health inspectors for purposes of inspecting food service operations when
ordinance provided entry at "reasonable time.")
32. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
33. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
34. 387 U.S. 523, 526n.1 (1967).





vate residence.3 7  The majority opinion stated that under the facts pre-
sented a search warrant was required, 38 and overruled Frank to the ex-
tent that it authorized such warrantless searches. In rejecting the
Frank argument that the interests here protected are merely "periph-
eral", the court stated:
It is surely anomolous to say that the individual and his private prop-
erty are fully protected by the fourth amendment only when the individ-
ual is suspected of criminal behavior. For instance, even the most law
abiding citizen has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances
under which the sanctity of his home may be broken by official authori-
ty, for the possibility of criminal entry under the guise of official sanc-
tion is a serious threat to personal and family security.39
By recognizing that an individual's "right of privacy" is protected by
the fourth amendment apart from any considerations of the fifth
amendment, the Court adopted the construction urged by Judge Pretty-
man in the Little case.40 In addition, the Court rejected the notion
that adminstrative inspections are merely "civil" and not "criminal" in
nature, the position the Court had taken in Frank."
Having decided that a warrant was required once entry had been re-
fused, the Court went on to consider the standard of reasonableness
that should apply to administrative inspections. Though recognizing
that probable cause is the constitutional measure of reasonableness,
the Court rejected appellant's contention that a warrant should be is-
37. Id. at 540.
38. "Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current
experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes
of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it
has been authorized by a valid search warrant." 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). "As
we explained in Camara, a search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable
if conducted without a warrant." (emphasis added). See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
39. 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
40. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See nn. 13-17
supra for full elaboration of the Little decision.
41. "And even accepting Frank's rather remarkable premise, inspections of the
kind we are here considering do in fact jeopardize self-protection interests of the
property owner. Like most regulatory laws, fire, health, and housing codes are en-
forced by criminal processes. In some cities, discovery of a violation by the inspector
leads to a criminal complaint. Even in cities where discovery of a violation produces
only an administrative compliance order, refusal to comply is a criminal offense, and
the fact of compliance is verified by a second inspection, again without a warrant.
Finally, as this case demonstrates, refusal to permit an inspection is itself a crime,
punishable by fine or even by jail sentence." 387 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).
Vol. 1972:313]
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sued only on a showing of probable cause that a particular dwelling
has violated the code.42. The Court declared that in applying the
probable cause standard it is necessary to focus on the governmental
interest which is sought to be furthered. The interest involved here is
the prevention of conditions which are detrimental to the public health
and well being. Recognizing that this interest is different from that
involved in the search for the instrumentalities or fruits of a crime,48
the Court determined that the most effective means of satisfying the
relevant governmental interest is through an area inspection. 44  Ac-
cordingly a different standard for "probable cause" was established.
[P]robable cause to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection
are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards,
which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be
based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building .. .or the
condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon
specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling.45
42. Traditional probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within
their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy in-
formation [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief that" an offense was committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925); accord, United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107-09 (1965); Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175
(1949). It is clear that the nonapplicability of this test to the administrative search
area is the most desirable view. To require the warrant applicants to describe vith
particularity the basis for each premises to be inspected would place an impossible
burden on the administrative department and ultimately defeat the public interest
involved. See 65 COLTum. L. Rlv. 288 (1965). For a comparison of administrative
probable cause and criminal probable cause for the issuance of warrants see Note,
Administrative Inspection Procedures Under the Fourth Amendment-Administrative
Probable Cause, 32 ALB. L. REv. 155 (1967); 3 GONZAGA L. REv. 172 (1968).
43. See note 11 supra.
44. There are two common types of code-enforcement inspections. Complaint
inspections occur upon receipt of a complaint alleging possible code violations on the
part of the occupant or business owner. Area inspections are routine, periodic exami-
nations of all the structures in a particular locality. As to the reasonableness of the
area inspection the Court stated: ". . . a number of persuasive factors combine to
support the reasonableness of area code-enforcement inspections, First, such programs
have a long history of judicial and public acceptance. Second, the public interest de-
mands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that
any canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results.. . . Finally, because the
inspections are netiher personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of
crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy."
387 U.S. at 537. The Court then notes that the Frank decision supported this position.
Id.
45. Id. at 538.
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The Court in Camara noted two significant limitations on its hold-
ing that a warrant is required prior to an administrative inspection of a
private dwelling: (1) a warrantless inspection in an emergency situa-
tion is not foreclosed; 46 (2) the warrant requirement is obviated if
"proper consent" is given.47
The companion case of See v. City of Seattle presented the question
of whether the owner of a locked commercial warehouse could, con-
stitutionally, be convicted for failure to allow a fire inspector to con-
duct a warrantless inspection of the interior of the premises. 4" On the
basis of the decision in Camara, the Court held that the fire inspector
was required to procure a search warrant if the owner prohibited entry,
and that the owner may not be prosecuted for his refusal to allow the
warrantless search.49  The same "flexible standard" governing the is-
suance of a warrant was held to be applicable in this situation.5"
However, this holding, like that in Camara, had limitations: (1) the
Court did "not imply that busines premises may not reasonably be in-
spected in many more situations than private homes"; 51 (2) the Court
did "not decide whether warrants to inspect business premises may be
issued only after access is refused; since surprise may often be a crucial
aspect of routine inspection of business establishment. .. 5. (3) the
Court did not question "such accepted regulatory techniques as licens-
ing programs which require inspections prior to operating a business
or marketing a product."'
Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the four dissenters, found the consti-
tutional issues involved in these two companion cases had already been
decided in Frank. He was unable to find anything unreasonable about
the searches here involved.5 4  The dissent also rejected the majority's
46. Id. at 539; see notes 88-96 infra and accompanying text.
47. Id. at 528-30; see notes 59-71 infra and accompanying text.
48. 387 U.S. 541, 542 (1967).
49. Id. at 546.
50. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
51. 387 U.S. at 545-46.
52. Id. at 545 n.6. The Court in Camara did, however, note that "it seems likely
... warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused ... ." 387 U.S.
at 539. See notes 54-58 infra and accompanying text.
53. 387 U.S. at 546. For further discussion of the licensing exception, see notes
72-87 infra and accompanying text.
54. Justice Clark argues that each of these ordinances involved is "supported by
findings as to the necessity for inspection of this type," that the authority of the
inspector could be shown by a demand to see his identification card and that other
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contention that there will be few refusals of entry to inspect, thus
necessitating obtaining a warrant, by saying:
Human nature being what it is, we must face up to the fact that thou-
sands of inspections are going to be denied. The economics of the
situation alone will force this result. Homeowners generally try to
minimize maintenance costs and some landlords make needed repairs
only when required to do so. Immediate prospects for costly repairs
to correct possible defects are going to keep many a door closed to the
inspector., 5
Finally, Mr. Justice Clark argued that the "lesser" showing required
to secure a search warrant established by the majority "prostitutes the
command of the fourth amendment that 'no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause.' "56 He contended that the standard adopted
by the Court would result in warrants being "printed up in pads of a
thousand or more-with space for the street number to be inserted
-and issued by magistrates in broadcast fashion as a matter of
course."5 7  Mr. Justice Clark asserted that the magistrates' "rubber
stamp" acceptance of inspectors' complaints would destroy the integrity
of the warrant and degrade the issuing magistrate. 58
THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The Court in Camara and See clearly indicated that the warrant
requirement is not absolute. Mr. Justice White emphasized that the gen-
erally recognized exceptions to the warrant procedure were still avail-
able. The question to be explored is the extent to which the courts
have expanded the scope of these exceptions in the years since Camara
and See.
A. Consent
Traditionally, a warrant is not required to conduct a search when the
person has given his consent. Since consent involves the waiver of a
constitutionally protected right, particular attention has been directed
problems could be resolved by a telephone call to his supervisor. 387 U.S. at 549
(1967).
55. Id. at 553.
56. Id. at 547.





to the requirements for an effective waiver of this right. The stan-
dard applied in cases involving searches for the fruits or instrumentali-
ties of a crime requires that "consent must be unequivocal and specific,
freely and intentionally given." 59  In United States v. Thriftimart,
Inc.,0 0 the Ninth Circuit considered the question whether the def-
inition of consent to search employed in the area of criminal law
was also applicable in defining an effective consent to an administrative
inspection. Defendant warehouse managers gave their consent to an
inspection by agents of the Food and Drug Administration. The in-
spectors found evidence of violations of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act. On appeal, the defendants asserted that proper con-
sent had not been given, since the FDA inspectors failed to inform
the defendants of their right to insist upon a warrant before submitting
to the inspection. 0' The court found the consent effective and held
that consent to an administrative inspection was not subject to the
same requirements as in a criminal search. "62  The court noted the
difference in purpose between an inspection and a search, as well as
the absence of coercion in the administrative inspection. 3  Any
manifestation of assent "no matter how casual" could reasonably be
accepted as proper consent. 4 The court indicated the person need
not be informed of his right to insist upon a warrant.
The approach of the court in Thriftimart has been followed by
other courts which have considered the question of effective consent
to an administrative search. It is now the general rule that a person
"need not have been aware of his rights in order to consent to a sur-
59. Edelman, Search Warrants and Sanitation Inspections-The New Look in En-
forcement, 45 DENvE L.J. 296, 302 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as Edelman]. See
Mintz, Search of Premise by Consent, 73 DicK. L. REv. 44 (1968).
60. 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970), reh. denied,
400 U.S. 1002 (1971).
61. Id. at 1008. The defendants in this case argued that a waiver of the require-
ment of a search warrant "cannot be conclusively presumed from a verbal expression of
assent. The court [so they argued] must determine from all the circumstances whether
the verbal assent reflected an understanding, uncoerced and unequivocal election to
grant officers a license which the person knows may be freely and effectively with-
held". (emphasis added) Id.
62. Id. at 1008-9.
63. Quoting Camara the court points out: "... the administrative search is 'nei-
ther personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime' . . ." Id. at
1009. The inherently coercive element found to be lacking by the court was the uni-
formed, armed policeman carrying a badge.
64. Id. at 1010.
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vey of his premises." 65  Although the courts have not tightened the
requirements for consent beyond what the Camara Court dictated, they
have consistently held that once the owner has refused entry, any con-
sent subsequently given because of threat of prosecution is invalid.00
An additional problem in this area is the question of whose consent
is required for the court to find an effective authorization to conduct
an inspection. The two situations in which the difficulty is most
likely to present itself when dealing with code enforcement are: (1)
where an employee-employer relationship is present and (2) when a
landlord-tenant relationship is found to exist. The general rule with
respect to third party consent has been stated in the following terms:
. . . immunity from unreasonable search and seizure can be waived
only by the person whose rights are otherwise to be invaded or by some-
one known to have authority to make a waiver of that right for the
person to be affected in his absence, and such authority cannot be im-
plied or presumed. 67
When the third party is an employee the courts have looked to whether
the employee was acting within the scope of his authority at the time
he gave his consent to the inspection; 8 if so the consent is effective.
This approach appears to be no different from that employed in the
65. United States v. Hammond Milling, 413 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1969); cf.
United States v. Kramer Grocery Co., 418 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Kendall Co., 324 F. Supp. 628 (D. Mass. 1971); United States v. Morton Provision
Co., 294 F. Supp. 385 (D. Del. 1968) (consent obtained without apprising the de.
fendants that the investigation and any evidence discovered could be used against them).
66. United States v. Kramer Grocery Co., 418 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1969) (defend-
ant repeatedly refused entry to FDA inspectors, consenting only after he was informed
that he could not stop the inspection). See also United States v. Stanack Sales Co.,
387 F.2d 849 (3rd Cir. 1968). ("It is clear that the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures can be waived. . . . However, the waiver must be
clear and intentional. . . . We should hesitate to find a waiver, particularly where
the circumstances make it unclear whether the area searched was covered by the con-
sent.") Id. at 853.
67. Edelman, supra note 59, at 303.
68. See United States v. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 431 F.2d 303 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970); Akin Distributors of Florida, Inc. v. United States,
399 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1968). In the foregoing two cases, the employer gave the em-
ployee express authority to permit the search. As a result, the courts had no prob-
lem in finding the agents' consent valid. However, where no express authority is
found, it can be expected that the courts will employ a test encompassing an examina-
tion of the area under the control of the employee, as has been done in the area of
criminal searches. See Note, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure, 1967 WASH.
U.L.Q. 12, 29.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss2/7
Vol. 1972:313] ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS
criminal search.6 9 Two views have been expressed on the question of
whether a tenant's consent to an inspection of his apartment is binding
on the landlord. The first holds that, since the tenant has rights co-
equal with those of landlord with respect to the leased premises,
either may give his consent to a search. 70  The other approach holds
that the tenant cannot "consent to a search of property personal to her
landlord" even though it be within the leased premises. 71
B. Licensing
A second generally recognized exception to the warrant require-
ment involves the inspection of a licensed business. 72 The courts
since Camara and See have allowed a somewhat broadened use of the
exception, but have adhered to certain specific limitations. While
there was some question as to whether the licensing exception applies
to inspections of a licensed business beyond the initial inspection re-
quired to obtain a license, 73 courts have indicated it does. A California
appellate court faced the issue in People v. White,74 a case involving
69. See Note, Third Party, Consent to Search and Seizure, 1967 WAsH. U.L.Q.
12.
70. People v. Sybil Holding Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 693, 315 N.Y.S.2d 496 (N.Y. City
Crim. Ct. 1970). See also People v. Taddeo, 62 Misc. 2d 833, 310 N.Y.S.2d 424
(N.Y. City Ct. 1969).
71. People v. Rosenthal, 59 Misc. 2d 565, 299 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. City CL 1969).
72. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that the
licensing exception to the warrant requirement only applies where closed commercial
premises are involved, because business premises which are open to the public have been
recognized as falling outside fourth amendment protection, at least with respect to the
initial warrantless entry onto the premises. See, e.g., United States v. Golden, 413
F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hofbrauhous of Hartford, Inc., 313 F.
Supp. 544 (D. Conn. 1970).
73. The problem arose because of uncertainty over the meaning of Justice White's
statement in See as follows:
We do not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be
inspected in many more situations than private homes, nor do we question
such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require in-
spections prior to operating a business or marketing a product. Any con-
stitutional challenge to such programs can only be resolved, as many have
been in the past, on a case-by-case basis under the general Fourth Amendment
standard of reasonableness. [emphasis added]" 387 U.S. at 545-46.
Blabey, See and Camara" Their Far-Reaching Effect on State Regulatory Activities
and the Origin of the Civil Warrant in New York, 33 ALB. L. Rlv. 64, 77 (1968)
[hereinafter referred to as Blabeyl wherein the author states: "Thus, the careful ad-
ministrative practitioner will not force an inspection after the business is licensed if
met with objection. A reasonable search requires a warrant."
74. 259 Cal. App. 2d 936, 65 Cal. Rptr. 923 (App. Dep't Super. Ct., L.A. 1968).
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a warrantless inspection of a convalescent hospital which was operated
under a license issued by the state department of health. State statutes
required that such facilities be licensed and that periodic inspections
of the hospitals so licensed be made, but did not require the inspection
officer to procure a search warrant if entry was denied. The defendant
asserted that under See the officer was required to secure a warrant
after entry was denied for every inspection after the initial one.1
The court rejected that contention because of the resultant interference
with the enforcement of reasonable health codes.7 6  The court con-
cluded that "searches or seizures pursuant to licensing statutes which
require inspection are valid and not subject to constitutional objection. 1177
While the court did not expressly say so, it seems likely that the
exception is premised on a theory of implied consent. By applying
for and accepting the license the licensee has given his consent to
those searches necessary to assure compliance with the statutory
scheme. The court in John D. Newman Properties, Inc. v. District
of Columbia Board of Appeals and Review7" adopted this approach
holding that petitioner, by applying for a license to operate a building
as a multi-family dwelling, was "taken to have consented to the in-
spection.' ' 9
Although the use of the warrantless license inspection has been ex-
panded, the rights of the licensee have not been ignored. The
Supreme Court, in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,0
warned that inspectors must adhere strictly to the provisions of the
statute under which they are operating. Having observed a possible
violation of the federal excise tax law, a federal agent demanded entry
to the defendant's locked liquor storeroom, but was repeatedly denied
access. The agent broke the lock and seized the liquor. The peti-
75. 259 Cal. App. 2d 936, 938, 65 Cal. Rptr. 923, 925.
76. 259 Cal. App. 2d 936, 941, 65 Cal. Rptr. 923, 925-26.
77. 259 Cal. App. 2d 936, 942, 65 Cal. Rptr. 923, 927. For other cases that
have accepted the view adopted in White, see Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); United States v. Golden, 413 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Sessions, 283 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Ga. 1968); State Liquor Comm. v.
Gilbert, 270 A.2d 876 (Me. 1970); Clark v. State, 445 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App.
1969); Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333, 481 P.2d 669 (1971); cf. Salt Lake
City v. Wheeler, 24 Utah 2d 112, 466 P.2d 838 (1970).
78. 268 A.2d 605 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970).
79. Id. at 606.
80. 397 U.S. 72 (1970); see also Hill v. State, 238 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1970) (court




tioner, licensed to serve liquor in New York and holder of a federal
tax stamp for retail liquor dealers, brought suit for the return of the
liquor and for its suppression as evidence. The district court granted
the relief, but was reversed by the court of appeals. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that Congress provided for a fine of $500.00
which was the sole remedy available for refusal to allow an inspec-
tion."' Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority stated:
As respects that industry [liquor] and its various branches including
retailers, Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of reason-
ableness for searches and seizures. Under the existing statutes, Con-
gress selected a standard that does not include forcible entries without
a warrant. It resolved the issue, not by authorizing forcible, warrantless
entries, but by making it an offense for a licensee to refuse admission
to the inspector.82
Courts have also scrutinized the licensing statutes and ordinances
themselves to insure against unconstitutionally vague and overly broad
statutory directives. In Salt Lake City v. Wheeler,3 the Utah Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional a city ordinance which gave the police
department power to inspect licensed premises. The ordinance con-
tained no limitation on when a search could be conducted.8 4
Limiting the scope of the inspection authorized by the license is an-
other means by which courts have sought to protect the rights of the
licensee. Finn's Liquor Shop Inc. v. State Liquor Authority85 is illus-
trative of this point. Petitioner granted a State Liquor Authority in-
spector permission to inspect his premises. The inspector also had
statutory authorization to conduct the inspection. The inspector went
to a room in the rear of the shop and searched the pockets of a coat
81. 26 U.S.C. § 7342 (1970).
82. 397 U.S. 72, 77.
83. 24 Utah 2d 112, 466 P.2d 838 (1970).
84. Id. See Vagabond Club v. Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P.2d 691
(1968) which the court in Wheeler found to be dispositive of the issue involved. In
the Vagabond Club case the court declared unconstitutional an ordinance which re-
quired owners of licensed social clubs to furnish a key to the police so that they
might conduct "inspections". See also Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333,
481 P.2d 669 (1971) in which the court, in dicta, said that it was unable to discern
any constitutional problem with a statute which required licensed clubs to permit
police officers and other officials to inspect the clubhouse any time during which it
is open.
85. 31 App. Div. 2d 15, 294 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 647, 249
N.E.2d 412, 301 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969).
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hanging there, though the books and records of the business were pro-
duced upon request. The search of the coat yielded sales slips which
were evidence that petitioner was engaging in credit sales of liquor in
violation of state law. When the Authority suspended his license for
10 days, petitioner appealed contending there was no evidence to sus-
tain the charges because the slips were the fruit of an unlawful
search.8 6 The court upheld this contention saying:
Balancing the need for the search against the invasion and recalling that
the [State Liquor Authority] has prior information, it not appearing
this was an emergency, no reason is advanced why a warrant could not
have been obtained. Finn was reasonably entitled to expect his per-
sonal clothing to be free of a warrantless governmental intrusion. 7
C. Emergency
An exception to the holding of Camara exists when the court finds
the search was conducted in an emergency situtation. This was expli-
citly recognized by the Supreme Court when it said: "Since our hold-
ing emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness, nothing we
say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a
warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situa-
tions.")88
The case most often noted as an example of an emergency situation
is North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago."0 Although the case
was decided long before 1967, and deals with a different (although
not unrelated) problem, an examination of it is profitable because of
the rationale used to justify the exception. In this case certain city
86. At the license suspension hearing it was established that the inspection was
made because the Authority had received a letter stating that the petitioner was en-
gaged in credit sales and that the slips could be found in his coat pocket.
87. 31 App. Div. 2d 15, 19, 294 N.Y.S.2d 592, 596. See Note, The Right of the
People to be Secure: The Developing Role of the Search Warrant, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
1119, 1128 (1967) wherein it is argued:
... consent to inspection does not mean consent to unreasonable inspection.
The waiver required of the licensee should be carefully limited to inspections
conducted during business hours. Even if the waiver is not so restricted, the
reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment's first clause will still
limit the time and extent of governmental intrusion.
But cf. Clark v. State, 445 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
88. 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1968).
89. 211 U.S. 306 (1908). Cited also by the Court in Camara were: Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186




officials, pursuant to statutory authorization,90 ordered the surrender
by the complainant of allegedly unfit poultry. In explaining why a
hearing was not required prior to the seizure of the poultry, the
Court addressed itself to the emergency situation. Mr. Justice Peck-
ham, writing for the Court, said:
The right to so seize is based upon the right and duty of the state to
protect and guard, as far as posible, the lives and health of its inhabi-
tants, and that it is proper to provide that food which is unfit for
human consumption should be summarily seized and destroyed to pre-
vent the danger which would arise from eating it. The right to so
seize and destroy is, of course, based upon the fact that the food is
not fit to be eaten. Food that is in such a condition, if kept for sale
or in danger of being sold, is in itself a nuisance, and a nuisance of the
most dangerous kind, involving, as it does, the health, if not the lives,
of persons who may eat it.91
Repeated recognition of the emergency doctrine in judicial opinions
evidences its continued vitality.92 An interesting case decided shortly
after the decisions of Camara and See is Scherer v. Brennan.93
This was an action against treasury agents assigned to secure the pro-
tection of the President of the United States. The duties of the agents
necessitated the constant surveillance of plaintiff, a firearms dealer
maintaining a cannon at his home near the place the President was to
90. CHCAGo REVISED MUNICIPAL CODE § 1161 (1905) cited in 211 U.S. at 308:
Every person being the owner, lessee or occupant of any room, stall, freight
house, cold storage house or other place, other than a private dwelling, where
any meat, fish, poultry, game, vegetables, fruit, or other perishable article
adopted or designed to be used for human food, shall be stored or kept,
whether temporarily or otherwise, and every person having charge of, or
being interested or engaged, whether as principal or agent, in the care of or
with respect to the custody or sale of any such article of food supply, shall
put, preserve and keep such article of food supply in a clean and wholesome
condition, and shall not allow the same, nor any part thereof, to become
putrid, decayed, poisoned, infected or in any other manner rendered or made
unsafe or unwholesome for human food; and it shall be the duty of the
meat and food inspectors and other duly authorized employ'es (sic] of the
health department of the city to enter any and all such premises above speci-
fied at any time of any day, and to forthwith seize, condemn and destroy
any such putrid, decayed, poisoned and infested food, which any such inspector
may find in and upon said premises.
91. 211 U.S. 306, 315.
92. See, e.g., Scherer v. Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1021 (1967); People v. Cacciola, 64 Misc. 2d 670, 315 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Dist.
Ct. 1970); Sandflow Realty Corp. v. Diaz, 64 Misc. 2d 625, 315 N.Y.S.2d 487 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1970), afJ'd, 66 Misc. 2d 904, 322 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
93. 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967).
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visit. In his complaint plaintiff alleged that these agents, in the per-
formance of their duty, trespassed on his property and unlawfully in-
terfered with his access to, and occupation of, his place of residence
by not permitting him to enter his home unaccompanied. The court,
basing its decision on the doctrine of immunity of governmental offi-
cials held that the agents were not liable. In response to the argument
that the officials were not acting in conformance with the fourth
amendment, the court said:
Furthermore, we do not believe there is any Supreme Court case re-
quiring a warrant in an emergency situation. Here, the need to pro-
tect the President of the United States from possible physical harm
would justify measures that might not be considered appropriate in
routine health inspections.Y4
The exception of emergency situations from the warrant require-
ment is both necessary and desirable in situations involving an imme-
diate threat to the health or lives of individuals. The exception, how-
ever, is not an open invitation to officials to forego the warrant pro-
cess. The factual situations of the cases cited by the court in Camara95
illustrate that this is intended to be a narrow exception to an otherwise
firm rule.9 6
As the cases surveyed indicate, neither the licensing nor the emer-
gency exceptions have been expanded beyond the bounds generally re-
cognized at the time of Camara and See. While it can be argued that
the licensing exception has been broadened by applying it to inspec-
tions during the life of the business,9" it is at least as likely that this
use of the exception was anticipated by the Court in See.
It is the consent exception that has been potentially expanded to the
point of swallowing the constitutional safeguard intended as the gen-
eral rule. Believing there would be few instances of refusals of en-
try, Mr. Justice White noted that normally a warrant would not be needed
until entry was refused.9" The courts since 1967 have carried that
statement one step further by holding that the inspectors need not in-
94. Id. at 612.
95. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Compagnie Francaise v. Board
of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902); Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N.E. 498
(1929).
96. See Nelson, Building, Health and Housing Code Inspection in MissourI-A
Need for Legislation, 27 J. Mo. B. 572 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Nelson].
97. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.




form the owner of the home or business of his right to refuse entry.90
The owner can give "proper consent" without knowing his rights.
Regardless of the equity of that result, the practical effect of this in-
terpretation of consent could be the virtual elimination of future
Camara-type cases. Unless the owner of the home or business knows
he has the right to refuse entry when confronted with a request to
submit to a warrantless inspection, it is doubtful he will object to the
inspection. It will be the rare person who, unaware of his rights and
confronted by a uniformed inspector at the door, will refuse entry at
the risk of what he almost certainly believes to be severe penalties.
Thus only those citizens who already know their rights, admittedly a
not insubstantial percentage, will be protected by the Camara-See
safeguards.
The courts have sought to justify this curious result by distinguishing
between administrative inspections and criminal searches. However,
since this position allows a person to waive the constitutional safe-
guard against warrantless inspections without ever knowing of its exist-
ence, doubts as to the validity of that result will continue to be raised
until the Supreme Court speaks to the issue. If the Court in Camara
and See did intend such an approach to be taken in determining whe-
ther "proper consent" was given, then it is difficult to justify the ex-
citement created by the decisions in Camara and See.
THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO Camara
Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting in Camara and See, expressed his dis-
agreement with the Court's action in the following terms:
It [the Court's decision] prostitutes the command of the Fourth Amend-
ment that 'no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause' and sets
up in the health and safety codes area inspection a new fangled 'warrant'
system that is entirely foreign to Fourth Amendment standards. It is
regrettable that the Court wipes out such a long and widely accepted
practice and creates in its place such enormous confusion in all towns
and metropolitan cities in one fell swoop. 100
One element of this subsequent confusion developed with regard
to the search warrants themselves. Some states discovered that al-
though a warrant was now required in this area they had no means by
99. See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
100. 387 U.S. 523, 547.
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which an inspector could procure one. 101 These states had statutory
schemes specifically delineating the circumstances under which a war-
rant could be issued but the statutes did not provide for the issuance
of administrative warrants. 0 2
The states' response to this situation took the following forms:
legislative action authorizing the issuance of such warrants, 03 court
action, 04 and enactment by home-rule municipalities of the necessary
ordinances. 05 We will here be concerned only with the first two.' 00
There is not complete agreement as to whether a court can issue a
search warrant in instances not provided by statute. Some say that
the authority to issue a warrant is limited only to those instances in
which there is statutory authorization or a Supreme Court Rule.10 7
Some courts, however, have held that they do possess such power,
although the reasons employed as a justification are not in complete
harmony. The decisions in Nevada and New York are illustrative.
At the time of the decision in Camara and See, New York was at-
tempting to obtain federal certification for its cattle as brucellosis
free.108  The procurement of the certificate necessitated the inspection
of all the cattle herds in the state by state veterinarians. The inspec-
tions were completed with the exception of one individual who ad-
amantly refused to allow the inspectors on his premises. New York
had no statute at this time authorizing the issuance of a search warrant
101. See Blabey supra note 73; Nelson supra note 96; and 4 WAxE FOREST INT1RA.
L. REv. 117 (1968).
102. See, Nelson, at 575.
103. CAL. Crv. PRO. §§ 1822.50-.57 (Deering Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-
27.1 to -27.2 (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-29.1-01 to -06 (Supp. 1971); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 45-24.3-14 to -15 (Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 66.122-
.123 (Supp. 1971).
104. See Blabey, supra note 73.
105. An interesting ordinance in this area is § 17-10 of the CODE OF METROPOLI-
TAN DADE COUNTY, cited in Heinlein v. Metropolitan Dade City, 239 So. 2d 635,
636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), which provides that "[t]he search warrant shall issue
in accordance with the requirements of the United States Supreme Court case Camara v.
Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco.. . ." See Nelson, supra
note 96 for an analysis of the difficulties of such legislation in Missouri.
106. See Nelson, supra note 96, at 577.
107. Id. at 575, 576. In 1968, after the report of an unofficial working committee
of the Missouri Supreme Court, it was decided that for the Missouri Supreme Court to
take such action would involve it in matters beyond its rule-making powers.
108. Brucellosis is a disease in cattle which results in the abortion of newly in-




under these conditions. Nevertheless an affidavit'09 was presented to
the court and the warrant was issued. The power of the court to issue
the warrant was based on a New York constitutional provision pro-
viding that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have general original juris-
diction in law and equity. ... ,"I Section 2-b of the Judiciary Law,"'
which confers on a court of record the power to "devise and make new
process and forms of proceeding necessary to carry into effect the powers
and jurisdiction possessed by it", and on the Supreme Court decisions
of Camara and See." 2
A similar problem was faced in Nevada in the area of building in-
spections and was handled in quite a different manner. In Owens
v. City of Las Vegas"3 an inspector, after repeated refusals by the
homeowner to allow entry, obtained a search warrant for inspection
purposes although it was not expressly provided for by statute. The
homeowner resisted the inspection by force and was subsequently con-
victed of assault and battery and obstructing a police officer attempting
to serve a search warrant. On appeal, Owens asserted the invalidity
of the search warrant because it was not authorized by state law. The
court dismissed this contention saying that when a warrant is issued
under circumstances not covered by state statute, the question then be-
comes whether the search was reasonable under the fourth amendment.
The court said that "just as a search authorized by state law may be
an unreasonable one under the fourth amendment, so may a search
not expressly authorized by state law be justified as a constitutionally
reasonable one." 1 4  Here it was held that the inspection was reason-
able under the fourth amendment. 1 5
109. The affidavit showed that the farm in question was already under quarantine
because of prior discovery of brucellosis, that the inspection was being conducted as
part of a statutory program, that the public interest involved was to prevent bovine
abortion and undulant fever caused by the disease, and illustrated the effectiveness of
the program. Blabey, supra note 73.
110. N.Y. CONST. art. VI § 7.
111. N.Y. JuDICLARY LAW § 2b (McKinney 1968).
112. See Blabey, supra note 73, for a detailed discussion of this procedure in
New York.
113. 85 Nev. 105, 450 P.2d 784 (1968).
114. Id. at ,450 P.2d at 786.
115. Id. at , 450 P.2d at 788. As to the reasonableness of the search appellant
argued that the search was "constitutionally impermissible" because the inspector
lacked probable cause to believe a code violation existed in the dwelling. The court
dismissed this contention saying that an exterior observation of code violations was
sufficient to establish probable cause for the search.
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In many instances the state legislature enacted the statutes necessary
to satisfy the new warrant requirement.' 6 Mr. Justice Clark, in his
dissent, expressed a fear that this requirement would result in addi-
tional, unnecessary "annoyances to the public." He said: "It will also
be more burdensome to the occupant of the premises to be inspected.
Under a search warrant the inspector can enter any time he chooses.
Under the existing procedures he can enter only at reasonable times
and invariably the convenience of the occupant is considered." ' 17
The statutory schemes established do not, in all instances, result in
the inconveniences suggested by Mr. Justice Clark. Many limit the
hours during which the warrant may be executed.' 18 Such a limita-
tion is desirable because it more nearly conforms to the avowed pur-
poses of inspection programs: to assure compliance with the various
codes rather than to seek out incriminating evidence where the ele-
ment of surprise might be helpful.
The statutes authorize the issuance of a warrant upon the showing
of probable cause and generally require a statement in the affidavit
that entry has been sought and refused. 1"0 There is a wide variance,
however, as to the time allowed for the execution of the warrant after
its issuance. The North Carolina and North Dakota statutes 20 re-
quire the warrant to be executed within twenty-four hours of its is-
suance, while California' 2 ' allows fourteen days. This longer period
of time allowed by California can perhaps be explained by a provision1
22
which requires prior notice that a warrant has been issued to be
given to any person who had previously denied entry to an inspector
unless the judge determines that immediate execution is necessary.
116. But see Nelson, supra note 96 where it is suggested that the refusal of an
occupant to allow entry to an inspector precludes any further action to inspect because
of the inability to procure a warrant in such circumstances in Missouri.
117. 387 U.S. at 555.
118. CAL. CIV. PRO. § 1822.56 (Deering Supp. 1971) (8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27.2(e) (Supp. 1971) (8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 29-29.1-04 :Supp. 1971) (8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 45-24.3-15 (Supp. 1970) (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
119. CAL. CiV. PRO. § 1822.50 (Deering Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-
24.3-15 (Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.122(2) (Supp. 1971). But see N.C.
GEN. STAT. 15-27.2 (Supp. 1971).
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27.2(e) (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENr. CODE § 29-29.1-04
(Supp. 1971).
121. CAL. CV. PRO. § 1822.55 (Deering Supp. 1971).




The California statute 12 3 also expressly prohibits forcible entry ex-
cept in special cases. 124 No other statute surveyed contains a similar
prohibition. For refusal to allow entry when a suitable order has
been issued, the Rhode Island formulation provides that the person
"shall be subject to such penalties as may be authorized by law for vio-
lation of a court order."'12 5 One could argue, however, that this pro-
vision is the sole relief available to an inspector for the refusal of a
person to comply with the order, and that a forcible entry would,
therefore, not be allowed.' 26 The California provision pertaining to
the forcible entry would seem to be the most desirable because of the
nature of the search involved. The possibility of physical injury to
both the occupant and the officer, inherent in a forcible entry, would
appear to outweigh the benefits to be derived from such a procedure,
except in cases where an immediate threat to the public health or
well being is found to exist.
An additional provision contained in some of the statutes is a limit-
ation on the use of the evidence obtained by these inspections. Of the
three states that have such a provision, Rhode Island's is the most dras-
tic. It provides:
Evidence so obtained shall not be disclosed except as may be necessary
in the judgment of the enforcing officer for the proper and effective
administration and enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and
rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto and shall not otherwise
be admissible in any judicial proceeding without the consent of the
owner, occupant, or other person in charge of the dwelling unit or
rooming unit, or structure inspected.12 7
North Carolina and North Dakota, on the other hand, do not allow
facts or evidence obtained in the inspection to be used in any subse-
quent proceeding if the warrant is invalid or if what is discovered is
not "a condition, object, activity or circumstance which it was the le-
gal purpose of the search or inspection to discover."' 2 s The above limit-
ation, however, does not apply in those instances in which a warrant
is not constitutionally required' 2 9
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-24.3-15 (Supp. 1970).
126. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
127. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 45-24.3-15 (Supp. 1970).
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Additional states will, no doubt, enact legislation in this area in the
future. 130  The desirability of such enactments is manifest for three
reasons: (1) to establish an identifiable basis for the issuance of
such warrants; (2) to erect basic guidelines for inspectors or officers
for the execution of the warrants; and (3) to delineate the purposes
for which the evidence obtained may subsequently be used. Home
rule municipalities might also enact ordinances in this area. For such
an ordinance to be held an effective exercise of the home rule power,
however, it must be shown that the subject matter is of local concern
and not a matter of state interest. 131  An additional approach at this
level, suggested by one commentator, 32 is to require occupants of
dwellings to consent to building and health inspections as a condition
to receiving municipal services or an occupancy permit. Possible sup-
port for such an approach, according to that author, can be found in
the Supreme Court decision of Wyman v. James.33  The specific man-
ner in which the states or municipalities solve this problem is minor
compared with the need for the authority to issue such warrants.
Legislation can only aid the states in their development of pro-
cedures to protect public health and safety, regardless of the direction
taken by the states on the questions of forcible entry and the use to
which the evidence may be put. It would eliminate the confusion
necessarily arising from reliance on the courts to mark the confines
of acceptable behavior. This is especially true in those states in which
denial of entry precludes any further action on the part of the inspector
because of the inability to procure a warrant. 34
Wyman v. James
The confines of the fourth amendment's application to administra-
tive searches have been most recently formulated by the Supreme
130. Blabey, supra note 73; Nelson, supra note 96.
131. Nelson, supra note 96, at 577. He expresses doubt that such ordinances
would satisfy the "local concerns" concept. Such ordinances, he feels, raise doubts
similar to those involved in ordinances attempting to authorize the appointment of re-
ceivers by circuit courts for the collection of rent to repair rental property, which the
Supreme Court of Missouri recently indicated was a matter of state interest.
132. Id.
133. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
134. Nelson, supra note 96. The necessity of such legislation is not sufficient to
overcome the concept that "a man's home is his castle" in all instances however.
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Court in Wyman v. James. 1 5  In this case, the plaintiff, mother and
beneficiary under the program for Aid to Families With Dependent
Children (AFDC), refused her caseworker's written request for a
home visit, as required by New York's welfare laws. 36  After a pre-
termination hearing 37 her assistance was discontinued. She brought
an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district
court, alleging a violation of her right of privacy and her right to be
free from unreasonable searches, as guaranteed by the fourth and
fourteenth amendments.138  The district court issued a temporary re-
straining order, convened a three-judge district court, and allowed the
case to proceed as a class action. 139  In a divided opinion, the district
court found the Supreme Court decision in Camara to be controlling.
The court held that the home visit is a search, and when not con-
sented to or supported by a warrant issued on the basis of probable
cause, such a search is unreasonable. 4 ° On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the home visit, as structured by
the New York statutes and regulations, are not "searches" within the
135. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
136. City of New York Dep't of Welfare Policies Governing the Administration of
Public Assistance § 175 (1967) provides: "Mandatory visits must be made in accord-
ance with law which requires that persons be visited at least once every three months if
they are receiving ... Aid to Dependent Children . . ." as quoted in 400 U.S. 309,
312 n.3. These policies were promulgated by the Department in accordance with
the requirements of N.Y. Soc. WELFARE L.w § 134 (McKinney 1966), which authorizes
the appropriate departments to issue regulations governing visits with individuals re-
ceiving public assistance. See generally N.Y. Dep't Soc. Servs., 18 N.Y. Codes, Rules
& Regs. §§ 351.10, 351.21 (1962).
137. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), held that due process, guaranteed
through the fourteenth amendment, required that the recipient be given an evidentiary
hearing prior to termination of benefits.
138. James v. Goldberg, 302 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Mrs. James also al.
leged that the proposed visit was a violation of Subehapter IV of the Social Security
Act of 1935. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1970). Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 314 (1971).
Neither the district court opinion nor the majority opinion of the Supreme Court
discussed this allegation. In his dissent, however, Justice Marshall argued that § 2200
(a) of Part IV of the H.E.W. Handbook of Public Assistance is a regulation binding
upon the states that prohibited an unconsented home visit, and by implication, the de-
nial of benefits for withholding consent. Id. at 345.
139. 302 F. Supp. at 481.
140. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd sub nom., Wyman
v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). Furthermore the court ruled, in order to condition the
receipt of welfare benefits upon the surrender of a constitutional right, the state must
show a compelling public interest served by the surrender. Id. at 942. See 45
N.Y.U. L. REv. 168 (1970), 48 N.C. L. REv. 1010 (1970), 65 Nw. U.L. Rv. 113
(1970), 79 YALE L.J. 746 (1970).
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fourth amendment meaning of the term, 4' but that even if they were
deemed to be searches, they did not violate the fourth amendment's
standard of reasonableness. 142
The Court's refusal to characterize the caseworker's home visit as a
"search" was based on the nature and the purposes of such visits.
While the majority conceded the home visit served an "investigative"
function in conjunction with its "rehabilitative" purposes, it was felt
the investigative aspect had been overemphasized when compared with
a search in the traditional criminal law context.143  The Court noted,
in particular, that the visitation is not forced but must be accompanied
by the recipient's consent for it to take place.144  However, the most
significant factor in the Court's determination that the home visit is
not a search came from its finding that the beneficiary's denial of
permission to visit could not serve as a basis for criminal sanction,
but rather only the cessation of benefits.' 41
Justice Blackmun then presented the Court's alternative holding
that, even assuming the visit to be a "search", the procedure is not un-
constitutional "because it does not decend to the level of unreason-
ableness" proscribed by the fourth amendment.141 In the course of
the opinion he stated eleven factors which supported the Court's ulti-
mate finding that "home visitation.., is a reasonable administrative tool
... [that threaten[s] the plaintiff with neither] an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [nor the infringement of any right protected]
141. 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1970).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 317-20. See also Note, Rehabilitation, Investigation and the Welfare
Home Visit, 79 YALE L.L 746, 748-51 (1971).
144. The Court indicated that "[ilf consent to the visitation is withheld, no
visitation takes place. The aid then never begins or merely ceases, as the case may be.
There is no entry of the home and there is no search." 400 U.S. at 317-18. See note
155 infra and accompanying text, wherein Justice Douglas, dissenting, questions whether
a valid consent could be given to the home visitation. See Reich, Midnight Welfrae
Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J 1347; Note, Effective Consent to
Search and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 260 (1964). Contra, Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528 (1963), where the Court held involuntary a confession to unlawful
possession and sale of marijuana when the police told the defendant that if she did not
confess she would lose her welfare payments, would go to jail for 10 years, and would
lose her two young children; Parrish v. Civil Service Comm., 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d
223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967). e.
145. 400 U.S. at 317-18; contra, 400 U.S. at 326 (Douglas, J., qissenting); 400
U.S. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).




by the fourth amendment."' 47  In considering the reasonableness
of the home intrusion, the Court stressed three legitimate state
interests which were furthered by the home visit. Specifically, the
Court found the visits were helpful in protecting children from abuse,
in preventing fraud, and in rehabilitating the recipient. In sum, the
Court remarked that the procedure was:
A gentle means14 8 . . . [giving] written notice several days in advance
of the intended home visit. . . and [providing that] [f]orcible entry or
entry under false pretenses or visitation outside working hours or snoop-
ing in the home are forbidden, . . . [which] minimizes any 'burden' on
the homeowner's right against unreasonable intrusion.' 49
The final consideration on which the Court based its findings of rea-
sonableness was the non-penal nature of the visit: "The home visit
is not a criminal investigation, does not equate with a criminal investi-
gation, and . . . is not in aid of any criminal proceeding."'15  The
Court distinguished the Camara, See, and Frank decisions on the
ground that those cases "arose in a criminal context where a genuine
search was denied and prosecution followed."'15  Accordingly, the
Court concluded that the warrant requirement of Camara was inap-
plicable because no criminal penalty attaches to a welfare recipient's
refusal to permit a home visit.'52
Justices Douglas, Marshall and Brennan dissented from both of the
majority's holdings. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, con-
cluded that since the HEW regulations impliedly bar such mandatory
visits, it was unnecessary to decide the case on constitutional
grounds.'0 3 He argued, moreover, that the majority discarded the ab-
solute protection against warrantless administrative intrusions that
Camara guaranteed. Specifically, he felt that Camara could not be
distinguished from Wyman on the ground that a more severe intrusion
or more onerous sanction was involved in Camara.15 4  Justice Marshall
147. Id. at 326.
148. Id. at 319.
149. Id. at 320-21. "It is true that the record contains 12 affidavits. All essen-
tially identical, of aid recipients (other than Mrs. James) which recite that a case-
worker 'most often' comes without notice; that when he does, the plans the recipient
had for that time cannot be carried out; ... " Id. at 320 n.8.
150. 400 U.S. at 323.
151. Id. at 325.
152. Id.
153. 400 U.S. at 345-47.
154. "Actually the home visit is precisely the type of inspection proscribed by
Vol. 1972:313]
Washington University Open Scholarship
342 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1972:313
also quarreled with what he considered the majority's disregard of the
investigative nature of the home visits, since the Court expressly recog-
nized that a caseworker is under a statutory duty to report criminal
violations detected during the home visit.""
Justice Marshall then attacked the alternative holding of the majority
(the visit, if it is a search, is not unreasonable), by arguing that the
Court had failed to show that the visits fit any existing exception to
the warrant requirement or that they justified the creation of a new
exception.150 However, Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opin-
ion,'5 7 argued that the fourth amendment affords protection against
all governmental intrusions, and, by forcing welfare recipients to
choose between consenting to the search and forfeiting benefits, the
state was conditioning the receipt of its largesse upon the surrender of
a constitutional right.'"
Any discussion of the effect of Wyman on the law of administrative
inspections is necessarily speculative, both because of the lack of au-
thoritative rulings to date based on Wyman and because of the ina-
bility of the Court to pinpoint a definitive holding in the case.
It is possible to argue that the decision will have little effect on the
Camara and See, except that the welfare visit is a more severe intrusion upon privacy
and family dignity." Id. at 340. "Even if the magnitude of the penalty were rele-
vant, which sanction for resisting the search is more severe? For protecting the pri-
vacy of her home, Mrs. James lost the sole means of support for herself and her infant
son. For protecting the privacy of his commercial warehouse, Mr. See received a $100
suspended fine." Id. at 341. Additionally, Justice Marshall notes that the Court has
in the past rejected as "anomalous" the contention that only suspected criminals are
protected by the fourth amendment. He states: "In an era of rapidly burgeoning gov-
ernmental activities and their concomitant inspectors, [and] caseworkers .... a re-
striction of the fourth amendment to the 'traditional criminal law concept' tramples
the ancient concept that a man's home is his castle. Id. at 339. The cases are in-
distinguishable on another ground since the criminal prosecution in Camara did not
arise from evidence obtained during inspection, but was the sanction for refusing entry,
just as the denial of benefits was the sanction in Wyman. Id. at 340.
155. See N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAw § 145 (McKinney 1966); N.Y. PENAL LAv
§ 175.35 (McKinney 1967) (classifies as a felony the filing of a statement, known to
be false, to mislead a public official.) Welfare fraud and child abuse, offenses
which could be detected during a home visit, are also felonies in New York. 400
U.S. at 339.
156. 400 U.S. at 341. See notes 161-63 infra and accompanying text.
157. 400 U.S. at 326.
158. Id. at 327-28. "Whatever the semantics, the central question is whether the




law of administrative inspections because of the Court's first holding
that the welfare home visit was not a search and therefore not subject
to fourth amendment constraints.'6 9 Support for this proposition can
be inferred from the recognized principle that the fourth amendment
does not apply to each and every governmental entry into the home. 60
This view of Wyman seems unlikely however, since the Court did in
fact deal with the case as a fourth amendment problem in arriving
at its alternative holding.
Several other interpretations, premised on the Court's treatment of
the fourth amendment issue, seem more plausible. Justice Blackmun
found that if in fact the home visit was a search, it was a reasonable
one and no warrant was needed. This result suggests several alterna-
tive interpretations. First, the Court could have created a new excep-
tion to the warrant requirement for welfare home visits. There is sup-
port for this view in the emphasis the Court places on the unique
characteristics of the home visit and the welfare program in general.' 6"
If this is in fact what the Court intended, the case will have little effect
on the continued validity of Camara and See.
Secondly, the case does not fall under an already recognized exception.
The caseworker was not faced with an emergency situation, nor did
Mrs. James give her express consent. In addition, no actual license
was involved.
Thirdly, the Court might have created a hybrid exception, by ex-
tending the licensing rationale used in See to the welfare area. When
the owner of a business applies for a license which grants certain
benefits, he is considered to have given his consent to inspections de-
signed to monitor the licensing program. The Court suggests that this
reasoning applies to the home visit; by accepting welfare benefits, the
recipient thereby impliedly consented to a reasonable home visit.
162
If the Court did extend the implied consent-licensing rationale into
the welfare context, Wyman will have significance beyond its factual
setting. Acceptance of the premise that the government can condition
the receipt of welfare benefits upon the implied consent to search
raises the question of whether the receipt of other benefits, such as
159. 400 U.S. at 317-18.
160. See 40 U. CiN. L. REv. 157, 162 (1971).
161. 400 U.S. at 319-23.
162. Id. at 324-25; see also 400 U.S. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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heating, water and other municipal services may also be conditioned
on the implied consent to search.1"3 The effect of such an approach
on administrative inspection would be to remove the Camara-See
constitutional safeguards from those governmental intrusions related
to the receipt of benefits.
A fourth interpretation of the Court's treatment of the fourth amend-
ment views the decision as a reinstatement of the Frank rationale and
an overruling sub silentio of Camara and See. The basis of the latter
two decisions was the assertion that there was no justifiable reason to
distinguish between civil and criminal searches; the warrant require-
ment should pertain to both.164  The warrant was considered the
method for insuring the reasonableness of the search. Thus the two
clauses of the fourth amendment were thought of as interdependent.
A warrantless inspection was "presumptively unreasonable."'61 5
While Justice Blackmum acknowledged the validity of Camara and
See, he ignored their reading of the fourth amendment and adopted
instead the Frank approach. A line was once again drawn between
"civil" and "criminal" searches, with reasonableness alone the guide to
the validity of a "civil" search. Implicit in this result is a belief that
the warrant clause of the fourth amendment can be considered apart
from the reasonableness clause, since the warrant requirement was in-
tended to apply only as a complement to the fifth amendment self-
incrimination clause in criminal searches.' 6 6
In so far as the decision may rest on the above reasoning, the
Court has not only rejected its interpretation of the fourth amendment
given only four years earlier, but substituted a result that is almost
certain to cause confusion. The Court has instructed the lower courts,
when confronted with "civil" searches, to consider any and all possible
factors indicating reasonableness. Yet there is no indication which of
the many elements discussed by the Court are the most significant nor
how many are needed to find that the search is reasonable. If this inter-
163. See Nelson, supra note 96. Such an approach has been used to find that stu-
dents have given implied consent to dormitory and locker inspections. See Moore v.
Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State University, 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968)
(dormitory search); People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d
22 (1966), vacated, 393 U.S. 85 (1968) (per curiam) (high school locker search).
164. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
165. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.




pretation is, in fact, the Court's position, Justice Blackmun has not
only undercut the constitutional protection against warrantless searches,
he has also managed to restore a considerable amount of uncertainty to
the law of administrative inspections.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court altered the law of administrative in-
spections in Camara and See, only five years after those decisions,
their validity has been undermined. At the same time that the states were
adopting new statutes to comply with Camara and See, the courts
were casting doubt on the soundness of the Supreme Court's approach.
The lower federal courts' expansion of the consent exception, when
coupled with the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement,
suggests that the Camara-See fact pattern will occur less frequently.
Finally the Court's decision in Wyman provides another possible basis
for skirting the Camara-See rulings. As a result, the law of adminis-
trative inspections remains unsettled.
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